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EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
SIDNEY

B. JACOBY*

The new statute entitled the Equal Access to JusticeAct 1 (hereinafter Act) is of great importance because it provides, on a three year
experimental basis, for the award of possibly large attorneys' fees and
other expenses to private parties of modest means in successful civil
The Act,
actions against the government, its agencies or officials.
2
actions.
tort
in
applicable
not
specifically
is
however,
The new Act entitles certain private parties prevailing in government litigation to recover attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and
other expenses against the United States, unless the government action
was "substantially justified" or "special circumstances make an award
unjust." 3 Within thirty days of final judgment in the action, the
party seeking an award must submit an application to the court
specifying the amount sought, including an itemized statement showing the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other
expenses were computed. 4 "Fees and other expenses" include fees of
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Antioch School of Law; Formerly, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Case Western Reserve Law School, and Cleveland State University
Law School; Columbia University, LL.B. 1939; Berlin (Germany) Law School, J.D. 1933.
Author of 1970 Ohio Civil Practice (Banks-Baldwin); Co-authored with Hon. David Schwartz, Government Litigation: Cases and Notes (1963 ed.) (2d ed. 1981, also co-authors Professors Lester, Noone, and Panzer); Co-authored with Hon. David Schwartz, Litigation with the
Federal Government (1970 ed.) (2d ed. 1982, also co-author Professor Steadman).
Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 201, enacted October 21, 1980, 94 Stat. 2325 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2412).
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982) provides:
(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in
addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in
any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) brought by or against the United
States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust.
4 The thirty day period is a statutory period, not a period established by rule, and therefore,
it cannot be extended by the courts. See Wallis v. United States, No. 453-79C (Ct. Cl., Nov. 25,
1981) (trial judge procedural order).
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1982) provides:
(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days
of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other
expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an
award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the
party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses
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expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, test, technical or
engineering report, and generally attorneys' fees not in excess of
$75.00 per hour. 5 Only a prevailing party of modest means is entitled
to an award, i.e., an individual whose net worth does not exceed $1
million, a corporation whose net worth does not exceed $5 million, or
the sole owner of a business which does not have more than 500
6
employees.
A number of earlier statutes, some with criminal sanctions, limited the attorneys' fees which the private party was permitted to pay
its attorney. Some of these statutes include Social Security, 7 Veterans
Insurance, 8 Trading with the Enemy Act, 9 and Military Personnel. 10

are computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was
not substantially justified.
5 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1982) provides:
(A) "fees and other expenses" includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project
which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case,
and reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded under this subsection
shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services
furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of
the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United States; and
(ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court
determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee.);
6 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1982) provides:
(B) "party" means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $1,000,000
at the time the civil action was filed, (ii) a sole owner of an unincorporated business,
or a partnership, corporation, association, or organization whose net worth did not
exceed $5,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, except that an organization
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.
501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Code and a cooperative
association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C.
1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization or
cooperative association, or (iii) a sole owner of an unincorporated business, or a
partnership, corporation, association, or organization, having not more than 500
employees at the time the civil action was filed;
7 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1976). Attorneys' fees may equal, whichever is smaller, (A) 25 percent
of past-due benefits awarded the claimant, (B) fixed fees, or (C) fees agreed upon between the
claimant and attorney as compensation for services. A violation of these limitations may subject
the attorney to a fine not exceeding $500, imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
8 38 U.S.C. § 784(g) (1976). Attorneys' fees may be awarded by the court but not in excess
of 10 percent of the amount recovered and to be paid by the Veterans' Administration.
50 U.S.C. app. § 20 (1976). The aggregate of fees paid attorneys, agents, or representatives is limited to 10 percent of the property, interests, or proceeds. Any person accepting any fee
in excess of this limitation, or retaining for more than thirty days any portion of the excess,
violates this statute.
10 31 U.S.C. § 243 (1976). Attorneys' fees in excess of 10 percent of the amount paid in
settlement violate this statute and subject the recipient to a misdemeanor conviction and a fine
not exceeding $1,000.
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The purpose of these statutory provisions has primarily been "to protect just claimants from extortion or improvident bargains."" However, the purpose of the new Act is entirely different. Its purpose is
"Equal Justice"--to insure that private parties are not deterred from
seeking review of or defending against unreasonable governmental
action because of the expense involved. And as Congress found, its
purpose is "to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or
defending against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award of attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other costs
2
against the United States."1
The new Act provides that, upon court order, the government
can be required to make a payment of fees to the private attorney. As
the legislative history points out,13 this is a significant modification of
the "American rule" and is more in accordance with civil law and the
law of the British Commonwealth. The "American rule" requires each
side to pay for its own counsel, although federal and state laws
contain many exceptions to this majority rule. The distinct feature of
the civil law and the British Commonwealth law is that "the loser
pays all," including the attorneys' fees of the winning party.
In more recent years, special statutes have been enacted under
which the successful party-claimant can collect its attorneys' fees from
the vanquished party. There are approximately 125 federal statutes
that entitle a prevailing party to obtain compensation for its attorneys'
fees. " Possibly the most outstanding example in this regard is The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 15 This statute perCalhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 173-174 (1920) (Brandeis, J.).
Its purpose has been in part to protect just claimants from extortion or improvident
bargains and in part to protect the Treasury from frauds and imposition. See United
States v. Van Leuven, 62 Fed. Rep. 52, 56. While recognizing the common need for
the services of agents and attorneys in the presentation of such claims and that
parties would often be denied the opportunity of securing such services if contingent
fees were prohibited, Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 45, Congress has manifested its
belief that the causes which gave rise to laws against champerty and maintenance
are persistent. By the enactment, from time to time, of laws prohibiting the assignment of claims and placing limitations upon the fees properly chargeable for services' Congress has sought both to prevent the stirring up of unjust claims against the
Government and to reduce the temptation to adopt improper methods of prosecution which contracts for large fees contingent upon success have sometimes been
supposed to encourage. The constitutionality of such legislation, although resembling in its nature the exercise of the police power, has long been settled. (Marshall v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 16 How. 314, 336; United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343,
354, 355; Ball v. Halsell, 161 U.S. 72, 82, 84) (footnote omitted).
12 Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(c)(1) 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 1418, S.Rep. No. 265, (96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 10B, at 8633-8635 (Dec. 1980).
14 Fed. Attorney Fee L. Rep. (Harcourt-Brace).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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mits the reasonable attorneys' fees of the prevailing party to be reimbursed by the vanquished party in suits under certain enumerated
civil rights statutes' 6 and formerly in certain tax suits.' 7

This provi-

sion is an important modification of the general "American rule" that
attorneys' fees are not recoverable by the prevailing party as part of its
damages or costs unless a statute otherwise provides.' 8 The Civil
Rights Act has no specific provisions as to whether an award of
attorneys' fees can be recovered from the United States as the defendant.19 But this omission has been remedied by the Equal Access to
JusticeAct. Section 2412(b) of the Act provides that the "United States
shall be liablefor [attorneys']fees and expenses to the same extent that
any other party would be liable under the common law or under the
terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award."20
Statutes embodying the principle that the successful claimant can
recover damages from the vanquished opponent, applicable against
the United States, include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,21
the Freedom of Information Act, 22 and the Back Pay Act. 23
"I Id. Reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded the prevailing party, other than the United

States, in any action under sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Pub.
L. 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
17 The language of the 1976 Act applying the Act to actions to enforce a provision of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code was stricken by section 205(e) of the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2330.
1 See Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). The Supreme
Court disallowed the recovery of attorneys' fees by the Wilderness Society from the United States
in litigation to prevent the issuance of permits required for construction of the Alaskan oil
pipeline. The Court held that under the "American rule" attorneys' fees are not ordinarily
recoverable by the prevailing party in federal litigation in the absence of statutory authorization.
For a full discussion of this case and its limitations, see R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law
666 (4th ed. 1980).
11 Cf. NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1979),
holding that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not expressly authorize
recovery of fees against the United States so as to waive federal sovereign immunity. Thus, the
United States is immune with respect to awards of attorneys' fees absent clear or express statutor'
authority to the contrary.
20 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (West Supp. 1982). But see, Red School House, Inc. v. Office of
Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Minn. 1974); Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs v. South East Coal Co., 598 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1979).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(k) (1976). The language of
this statute indicates that the calculation of the fee should not vary with the identity of the losing
defendant: "[T]he Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party .. .a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the . . .United States shall be liablefor the costs the same
as a private person." (emphasis added).
See also, Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir 1980) (en bane). In a successful
prosecution of a gender-discrimination class suit against the United States Department of Labor,
the court en bane adopted the market value of services approach for computing attorneys' fees.
The court stated that fees should be calculated no differently when the United States rather than
a private party is the losing party.
22 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
23 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1976), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1979).
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Some statutes award attorneys' fees under limited circumstances;
some require a party to establish specific proof of its claims, and some
have time limits for the submission of claims. The question arises
whether, under the discretionary authority of the court, 24 attorneys'
fees may be awarded in excess of the fee limitations specifically set
forth by these statutes. The answer should clearly be in the affirmative
for several reasons: (1) The fee limitations of these statutes are different from the "costs" provisions of section 2412(d) of the Act; 25 (2) the
Act does not mention provisions of this earlier legislation; and (3) the
specific exclusion of tort actions from the Act demonstrates that in the
absence of that provision, tort actions would have been covered by the
Act, even though there is a distinct fee limitation in the Federal Tort
26
Claims Act.
On the other hand, the fact that the attorney of the successful
claimant has received a substantial fee from the client may very well
be taken into consideration in the court's determination of whether
14 The term
-court" within the meaning of section 2412(d)(1)(A) is "any court having
jurisdiction of that action," i.e., District Court, or in a proper case, the Court of Claims.
25 For the rule authorizing the courts to impose costs, but not attorneys' fees, on the
vanquished government, see Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1976);
Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1235 n.165
(1967); Jacoby, Recent Legislation Affecting the Court of Claims, 55 Geo. L. J. 397, 405 (1966).
But that legislation was not implemented by the Court of Claims, apparently for the reason that
no costs should be awarded in the Court of Claims, and certainly not against the private party
losing a case. The same reasoning does not seem to apply against application of the new Act,
which is one-sided againstthe United States. There is no reason why the new Act should not be
applied in the Court of Claims.
26 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 to 2680 (1976). The reason why "cases sounding in tort" were
excluded from § 2412(d)(1)(A) seems to be due to the many ambiguities in the Federal Torts
Claim Act. This statute, in comparison with other equally brief statutes, has most frequently led
to Supreme Court litigation because many of the important issues were not explained specifically
in the statute; e.g., who can recover under the statute (soldiers? prisoners?); what does the
undefined term "discretion" mean; and has the tort law of absolute liability been excluded? The
government's desire to litigate not only a particular case but also to secure a whole program of
statutory enforcement, can be expected to result in many higher court cases. If the Federal Torts
Claim Act were applicable to the Equal Access to Justice Act, many higher court cases would
result and would generally be considered "substantially justified," within the meaning of §
2412(d)(1)(A).
See Laird v.Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966);
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949).
The legislative history of the Equal Access to Justice Act specifically expressed that "Constitutional tort" cases were not to be excluded, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(pertaining to the constitutionality of taking private property for public use); 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(a) and 1491. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 10B, at 8643 (Dec. 1980).
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"special circumstances" exist which "make an award unjust.

' 27

It

seems that in the proper case the award may be reduced, although not
completely denied.
The general question arises as to the effective date of application
of the new Act. While it has the effective date of October 1, 1981, a
more specific problem presented is whether the positions of the United
States which occurred before October 1, 1981, may be considered in
making the determination under the Act. In other words, is the new
Act applicable to a case where the substance of the court proceedings
took place before October 1, 1981, as long as the "thirty days of final
judgment" 28 of the court occur after October 1, 1981?
The guidelines of the United States Department of Justice, recently issued for all government attorneys confronting requests for
attorneys' fees, reach a negative conclusion. 2 The arguments against
application of the Act are as follows: (1) "Consent to suit should be
strictly construed;" 3 0 (2) the Act does not expressly give an affirmative
answer to the question posed; and (3) a retroactive application of the
Act occurs by applying it to proceedings begun before the Act was
even in effect.
In response to this line of argument, it may be pointed out: (1) a
liberal interpretation of the "strict construction" principle, recited
above, has sometimes been adopted by the courts; 31 and (2) the argument of a retroactive application of the Act, if adopted, would render
meaningless section 2412(d), which makes the Act applicable to any
civil action "which is pending on October 1, 1981." '32 If a case were
27

28
21

28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1982).
Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, Award of Attorney Fees and Other

Expenses in Judicial Proceedings Under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
See Lempert, Critics Hit Justice Equal Access Guidelines, Legal Times of Washington,
D.C., Jan. 25, 1982. See also the position of the Justice Department in Globe, Inc. v. United
States, No. 80-1898 (D.D.C. 1981).
3o See e.g., Mitchell v. United States, Ct. Cl., No. 772-71 (Oct. 21, 1981) (Nichols, J.,
dissenting) (recites the strict construction ideas of the Supreme Court in Court of Claims cases).
1' See United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 336, 383 (1949) and United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 545 (1951):
In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of Appeals, the Government relied upon the doctrine that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be
strictly construed. We think that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort
Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v.
Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30: 'The exemption of
the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld.
We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been
announced.'
See also, United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1952).
32 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 § 208; U.S. Code Cong.. & Ad. News 10B, at 8645 (Dec. 1980).
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pending on October 1, 1981, and the activities of the private attorney
caused the unjustified position and activities of the government before
October 1, 1981, then the Act could not provide for a recovery of
attorneys' fees. Further argument against the Department of Justice
guidelines is found in the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives. The Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office,
adopted by the House, listed the estimated authorization for fiscal
33 If
year 1982 as $92 million, and for fiscal year 1983 as $109 million.
activities before October 1, 1981, were intended to be totally excluded, there should have been a big difference between these two
fiscal years.
Several issues are likely to arise in the interpretation of the Act,
principally because its terms seem to be vague. What is meant by the
language "substantially justified?" 34 The Department of Justice guidelines express the view that a position of the government is substantially
unjustified only when it is unreasonable or when the government has
sued or defended even though no genuine dispute exists. Only future
litigation will demonstrate how the courts are going to interpret that
provision. But perhaps the position of the government need not be
unreasonable; rather, it may be sufficient if the government in litigating the case paid too much attention to the general construction of a
35
statutory scheme and too little attention to the individual's case.
Other fundamental issues involve the burden of proof and the
method of establishing that the activities were substantially unjustified. Does the private party have the burden of proving that the
activities were substantially unjustified, or does the government have
the burden of proving that they were "substantially justified?" Also,
may policy materials such as opinions, recommendations, or memoranda generated in deciding whether to bring a suit, be required to be
produced to establish the burden of proof?
A statement of the Assistant Attorney General submitted to the
House Committee on the Judiciary on May 20, 1980, strongly opposed
the efforts of the proposed bill to shift the burden of proof onto the

33 H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 10B,
at 8647 (Dec. 1980).
34 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1982).
35 In testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division, Department of Justice, found objections in the broad language
of "substantially unjustified" and would have preferred a statute which had the more stringent
test of "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless." Hearing on S.265, Equal Access to
Justice Act, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., May 20, 1980, Serial No. 62, at 38, 40.
(Statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
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government. Under that proposal, "the Government, in each case it
lost, would be required to come forward with evidence to defeat an
award of attorney fees."

36

The final version of sections 2412(d)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act
shows how the argument of the Assistant Attorney General was overcome in redrafting the statutory provisions. The grammatical structure of section 2412(d)(1)(A) makes it clear that the burden of proof is
on the government to show that its position was "substantially justified." This section states in pertinent part: "when the court finds that
the position of the United States was substantially justified .... ."And
the grammatical structure of section 2412(d)(1)(B) creates, not a burden of proof, but a burden of allegation requiring the private party to
allege in specific detail the manner in which the government's position
was unjustified. 37 The final sentence of this section states: "The party
shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified." The last sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B) was not
drafted in S.265, 96th Congress, 1st Session, which had passed the
Senate and on which hearings were held in the House Judiciary
Committee. 38 It was later drafted into the bill in recognition of the
fact that it is the private party who can identify the circumstances
which allegedly make the position of the government unjustified. But
the situation seems to be different when it comes to the actual proof of
those circumstances. Here the burden is on the government.
The recent Department of Justice guidelines, in fact, take a very
distinct stand on the suggested interpretation of "substantially justified" under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Because of the Act's
similarity in language to Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
39
Procedure, the interpretation of Rule 37 should be given weight.
Id. at 42.
Under our procedural system, the burden of allegation, of course, is a different concept
than the burden of proof. For a practical example showing in detail the two differing concepts in
the area of contributory negligence, see R. Field, B. Kaplan, K. Clermont, Materials for a Basic
Course in Civil Procedure 428 (4th ed. 1978).
18 Hearing on S.265, Equal Access to Justice Act, Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administrationof Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Con., 2d
Sess., May 20, Serial No. 62, at 10-13.
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) states in part:
(4) AWARD OF EXPENSES OF MOTION. If the motion is granted, the court shall
.. .require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion. . . to pay
the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including
attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall .. .require the moving party . . . to pay to
the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in
opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making
of the motion was substantiallyjustified or that other circumstances make an award
of expenses unjust. (emphasis added)
36

37
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Specifically, there should not be any attempt to discover "recommendations and advice on program policy" or documents that are "intraoffice and on policy, the kind that a banker gets from economists or
accountants. 4 0 Such matters pertain to the inner operations of the
government and should not be discoverable. Whether this broad admonition will always be followed is difficult to predict. In exceptional
cases, these matters might be discoverable. For example, following
the United States Supreme Court's reversal in United States v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 41 the lower court ordered the broad discovery of

intraoffice memoranda in the "upper echelon" of the Department of
Justice. 42 The extent of discovery seems to depend on the legitimate
breadth of the issues which have properly been raised by the private
party in its allegation of substantially unjustified activities. Certainly,
the issues under the Act are broader than those under Rule 37(c)(4),
where the issues relate only to clear failure to take a required discovery step under Rule 37(a)(2). It is important that the allegation of the
private party under section 2412(d)(1)(B) of the Act be made specific
and definite to avoid an unjustified expansion of discovery.
There is one certain allegation that would seem to be improper.
The private party should not be permitted to allege that the government decided to litigate a certain issue in his case, which was present
in a series of cases, because his large financial worth 43 eliminated the
danger that the government would ever be ordered to pay the party's
attorneys' fees. Could it be argued that it was unconstitutional under
equal protection doctrines for the government to make that choice?
Occasionally, the Court of Claims has held that equal treatment of all
taxpayers who are similarly situated need not be specifically required
by a statutory provision; however, in absence of a statutory scheme,
unequal treatment cannot be tolerated under equal protection doctrines. 44 The government's choice to litigate against the wealthy
party instead of a party of modest means would be permitted because
of the fair statutory scheme. As a more subtle example, assume arguendo that the government institutes an action under the False
Claims Act 45 against a wealthy defendant and a series of unrelated

"false claims" actions against non-wealthy defendants, both types of
40 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.CI. 38 (1958).

1' 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
41 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960).
13 For instance, a corporation whose net worth is $600 million is not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under § 2412(d)(2)(B).
44 See IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1965). For a
full discussion of this situation, see 2 West's Federal Practice Manual § 1849, at 777 (Rev. 2d ed.
1977) (S.Jacoby).
45 31 U.S.C. §§ 231 to 233 (1976).
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cases involving the same issue. The government's selection of the case
against the wealthy defendant for a trial on that issue would be
proper. The constitutional principle of equal protection cannot be
used to equalize the government's non-liability with possible liability
for attorneys' fees because the Equal Access to Justice Act has made a
fair distinction in the treatment of wealthy and non-wealthy private
parties. Though it may seem strange and certainly unprecedented that
the recovery of costs is determined by the wealth of the private party,
still such a distinction seems reasonable and not unconstitutional. It
should also be noted that the determination of whether a private party
is of modest means has been made more rigid under the Equal Access
to Justice Act. Section 2412(d)(2)(B) lists the financial worth of the
private party which is considered modest, and it specifically provides
that the party's net worth is determined "at the time the action was
filed. "46
CONCLUSION

There are, of course, numerous other questions which may arise
in the interpretation of the Act. 47 In conclusion, however, the discussion will consider what the abolition of the "American rule" may
mean from a broader procedural point of view. The general rule of
civil law and of the British Commonwealth is that the "loser pays all,"
including the attorneys' fees of the victorious opponent. 48 The application of this general rule, together with the civil law system which
generally disallows contingent fees, 49 has the function of discouraging
46 This would seem to render impossible attempts to change the status during the pendency
of the action. See also Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), which in cases of claims
against the United States limits the assignment of those claims, with specified exceptions.
47 One such question is what is meant by the clause that there shall be no recovery if "special
circumstances make an award unjust?" 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
The "reasonable" attorneys' fees which may be awarded to the attorney of the private
prevailing party shall be "based upon prevailing market rates" generally not in excess of $75 per
hour "unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as
the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee."
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1982). The question arises what shall the rate be of a
salaried attorney working for a public interest law firm?
In its Budget Message for fiscal year 1983, the Reagan Administration proposed to limit the
legal fees now paid to opposing private attorneys by the United States in civil rights and other
cases, and to severely restrict the amount of fees paid to public interest lawyers. Stuart, Reagan
Stalks Public Interest Lawyers' Fees, NY. Times, Feb. 19, 1982, at 14.
46 The author had occasion to observe the significance of this rule in Canada, in 1977, when
he taught as a visiting professor at the Western Ontario Law School in London, Ontario. The
author became familiar with some of the teaching materials in Canadian civil procedure. The
American casebooks and textbooks on civil procedure serve as useful guides, but always have to
be supplemented with a chapter showing the determination of attorneys' fees of the victorious
party, to be paid by the vanquished party.
11 England also generally disallows contingent fees, calling an attorney who would receive
them a "speculative solicitor." The prohibition of contingent fees, of course, requires a more
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some litigation. For instance, a poor plaintiff who is not permitted to
obtain the services of an attorney on a contingent fee basis, and who
would have to pay in addition to his own fees the attorneys' fees of the
victorious opponent, might hesitate to bring a stockholder's derivative
action. The existence of the "American rule," that is, the loser does not
pay all, and the existence of the contingent fee might serve to explain
why the United States, unlike other countries, has become such a
50
litigious country.
The Equal Access to Justice Act has become an important inroad
upon the "American rule." In discussing the civil law rule and the
contrary "American rule," Professor Schlesinger predicted that any
abolition of the "American rule" will not follow the civil law system of
awarding money "to all victorious litigants," but will grant recovery
to "pragmatically defined interest groups," such as plaintiffs in certain
types of actions, e.g., "environmentalists, victims of civil rights violations, or consumers. - 51 The prediction of Professor Schlesinger has
turned out correct only in part. But while, as illustrated above, many
statutes provided that the loser pay the attorneys' fees, section 2412(d)
is a provision on costs. The provision is highly discretionary but applies to all civil government litigation;it applies only for the benefit of
the private party and not for the government. The provision also
applies when the private party is the defendant.
As stated previously, section 2412(d) is valid only on a three year
experimental basis. Interpretations by the courts of the new Act will
indicate whether the Act is desirable. Is it wise to single out government litigation? 52 Is it wise to provide that the private party, when a
defendant, may recover? Is it wise to provide that only the private
party may recover? An affirmative answer to this last question seems
proper, but the answers to the first and second questions are not now
clear.

highly developed statutory legal aid system than exists in this country, to make it possible for the
poor plaintiff to obtain legal protection. See the comparative study by Jacoby, Legal Aid to the
Poor, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1940).
50 Adoption in this country of the principle "the loser pays all" has been strongly suggested;
see, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees be Allowed, 26 Cal. St. B.J. 107 (1951). But see,
Farmer v. American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964), in which Justice H. Black defended the
present practice.
51 R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 665-668 (4th ed. 1980). Professor Schlesinger
discusses the judge made exceptions to the "American rule," namely that recovery of counsel fees
of the
can be obtained when (1) the opponent acted in bad faith, and (2) where the victory
666.
at
Id.
fund.
common
a
created
has
party
prevailing
52 Government litigation was clearly singled out in the federal system. In the procedural
systems of the United States, there have been very few attempts to discard to some extent the
"American rule." See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303
(1977); Cal. Civ. P. Code § 1021.5 (West 1980).

